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UNITED STATES v. WHITE: FURTHER UNBALANCING THE 
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF FORCIBLE MEDICATION OF 
DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 
CYNTHIA POLASKO* 
In United States v. White,1 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit considered whether the federal government could 
force defendant Kimberly White to take antipsychotic medication 
against her will for the sole purpose of rendering her competent to 
stand trial.2  The court held that the government could not forcibly 
medicate White because its interest in forcible medication was not 
important enough to override White’s constitutional liberty interest in 
avoiding such medication.3  In making its decision, the court consid-
ered four factors,4 as set out by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Sell v. United States.5  In its opinion, however, the Fourth Cir-
cuit overcomplicated the Sell analysis by engaging in a conjectural sen-
tencing calculation while at the same time deemphasizing its focus on 
White as an individual.6  The court should have taken this opportuni-
ty to apply the four Sell factors in the form of a constitutional balanc-
ing test, which would have identified and weighed White’s specific 
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 1. 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Id. at 404–06.  
 3. Id. at 404–05. 
 4. Id. at 409–10. 
 5. 539 U.S. 166 (2003); see also infra Part II.B.2.  This Note uses the following phrases 
interchangeably: the four Sell factors, the Sell analysis, and the four-factor Sell test. 
 6. See infra Part IV.D.1. 
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liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medication against the govern-
ment’s interest in prosecuting White for her crimes.7  
I.  THE CASE 
On March 19, 2008, a grand jury in the Eastern District of North 
Carolina indicted Kimberly White on one count of conspiracy to 
commit credit card fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and 
three counts of credit card fraud and aiding and abetting.8  White was 
detained pursuant to a court order and psychiatrically evaluated to 
determine whether she was competent to stand trial.9  On July 22, 
2008, the district court found that White suffered from a mental dis-
ease or defect that rendered her incompetent to stand trial, as she was 
unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against her and 
to assist counsel in her own defense.10   
White was taken to the Federal Medical Center in Carswell, Texas 
(“FMC-Carswell”) for evaluation of whether she would be competent 
to stand trial in the foreseeable future.11  Based on her behavior at 
FMC-Carswell, doctors diagnosed White with Delusional Disorder, 
Grandiose Type.12  While doctors did not believe that White was dan-
gerous to herself or others if she remained unmedicated, White re-
fused to take any medication, and clinical staff exhausted all possible 
nonmedicinal treatments to render White competent.13  
On May 21, 2009, the district court held a hearing pursuant to 
Sell v. United States14 to determine whether the government could for-
cibly medicate White to render her competent to stand trial.15  The 
 
 7. See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 8. United States v. White, No. 5:08-CR-81-D-1, 2009 WL 3296096, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 
9, 2009), rev’d, 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at *2.  Specifically, White believed that she could create cures for AIDS and 
breast cancer out of her food, and as a result hoarded her food in her cell.  Id.  Because 
she was afraid that someone would steal her cures, White refused to allow FMC-Carswell 
staff to clean her cell and would not leave her cell to bathe.  White, 620 F.3d at 406. 
 13.  White, 2009 WL 3296096, at *2.  Because White was nonviolent, and her disorder 
did not put her health at risk, doctors did not consider White a candidate for civil com-
mitment.  Id. 
 14. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 15. White, 2009 WL 3296096, at *2. 
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court heard testimony from Dr. Leslie Powers, who testified as to 
White’s disorder and her behavior while at FMC-Carswell, and from 
Dr. Camille Kempke, who testified as to the possible treatments avail-
able to render White competent.16  In particular, Dr. Kempke provid-
ed testimony as to the drugs available to treat White’s condition, the 
recommended dosage of each drug, the process for forcibly adminis-
tering those drugs, and the possible side effects of the suggested med-
ications.17   
After hearing Dr. White’s and Dr. Kempke’s testimony, the dis-
trict court applied the four-factor Sell test to determine whether the 
government could forcibly medicate White.18  First, the district court 
concluded that the government had an important interest in prose-
cuting White for her serious crimes and that no special circumstances 
 
 16. Id.  The court recognized Dr. Powers as an expert in clinical and forensic psychol-
ogy and recognized Dr. Kempke as an expert in psychiatry.  Id.   
 17. Id. at *3.  Dr. Kempke identified three drugs she could administer to White that 
would treat her disorder: Haldol Decanoate, Prolixin Decanoate or Enanthate, and 
Risperdal Consta.  Id.  She also described the method she would use to forcibly medicate 
White: A FMC-Carswell team would enter White’s cell and restrain her before injecting her 
with a fifty milligram dose of Haldol Decanoate.  Id.  This process would repeat every two 
to four weeks, and White would always be given the opportunity to take the medication 
voluntarily before being restrained.  Id.  Possible side effects of the recommended drugs 
included tardive dyskinesia, extrapyramidal symptoms, agranulocytosis, and increased risk 
of diabetes and hyperlipidemia; Dr. Kempke, however, considered these side effects rare 
and stated that they could be addressed with other medications.  Id. at *3–4.  Drs. Powers 
and Kempke based their testimony that White could likely be restored to competence with 
antipsychotic medication in part on a 2007 study conducted by Dr. Herbel.  See White, 620 
F.3d at 420 (stating that the only medical research discussed by the doctors during the Sell 
hearing was the Herbel study).  In the Herbel study, twenty-two men with delusional disor-
ders were forcibly medicated for their disorders, and seventeen of them, or seventy-seven 
percent, were restored to competency as a result.  Id. at 420–21. 
 18. White, 2009 WL 3296096, at *5.  Pursuant to Sell, the government must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there is an important governmental interest at 
stake that is not mitigated by special circumstances; (2) forcibly medicating the defendant 
will render him competent to stand trial, but that the effect of the medication will not in-
terfere with the defendant’s ability to assist in his own defense; (3) involuntary medication 
is necessary to further the government’s interest; and (4) involuntary medication is medi-
cally appropriate and in the defendant’s best medical interests in light of his condition.  
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–81.  For an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sell, see infra Part II.B.2. 
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existed to undermine this interest.19  The court reached its determi-
nation that White was accused of serious crimes because she faced a 
statutory maximum of thirty-nine years in prison if convicted.20  Se-
cond, based on Dr. Kempke’s testimony, the district court found that 
antipsychotic medication was substantially likely to render White 
competent to stand trial without causing serious side effects or imped-
ing White’s ability to assist in her own defense.21  Third, the district 
court determined that White was unlikely to gain competence without 
medication, and that less intrusive means of treatment were not via-
ble.22  Finally, Dr. Kempke’s testimony persuaded the district court 
that the proposed medication regimen was medically appropriate for 
White based on her particular condition.23   
Because the district court found that the government satisfied 
the four-factor Sell test, it granted the government permission to for-
cibly medicate White so she would regain competence to stand trial.24  
The district court anticipated, however, that White would appeal to 
the Fourth Circuit and accordingly stayed the order permitting forci-
ble medication.25  The Fourth Circuit heard White’s timely interlocu-
tory appeal to determine whether the government demonstrated an 
important interest in prosecuting White that would overcome any 
showing of special circumstances.26 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Balancing tests are commonly utilized in constitutional decisions, 
especially when federal courts weigh individual constitutional inter-
ests against governmental interests.27  The individual right to be free 
from unwanted medical treatments, including unwanted medication 
with antipsychotic drugs, is derived from the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
 
 19. Id. at *5–6. 
 20. White, 2009 WL 3296096, at *5. 
 21. Id. at *6. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at *5–7.  In particular, the district court found that the government satisfied the 
test by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. 
 25. Id. at *7. 
 26. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
  
2012] UNITED STATES V. WHITE 255 
tion.28  When the government wishes to forcibly medicate an individ-
ual solely to render him competent to stand trial, the Supreme Court 
requires that a court consider four distinct factors, set out in Sell v. 
United States.29  After Sell, lower federal courts, including the Fourth 
Circuit, developed their own ways of reviewing and applying the four 
factors.30 
A.  The Supreme Court Has  Successfully Utilized Balancing Tests in 
Situations Where an Individual’s Personal Liberty Is Pitted Against 
the Government’s Interests 
When referring to a balancing opinion, this Note looks to the 
definition provided by Professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff: “By a ‘bal-
ancing opinion,’ I mean a judicial opinion that analyzes a constitu-
tional question by identifying interests implicated by the case and 
reaches a decision or constructs a rule of constitutional law by explic-
itly or implicitly assigning values to the identified interests.”31  Specifi-
cally, the constitutional balancing test advocated in this Note is an “ad 
hoc” balancing test, where “the process that the Constitution requires 
is determined by balancing the governmental and private interests at 
stake in the particular case.”32  Such an ad hoc balancing test cannot 
be satisfied merely through the application of a multi-factor test, be-
cause the two kinds of tests are inherently different: Multi-factor tests 
“ask questions about how one ought to characterize particular 
 
 28. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 29. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 30. See infra Part II.C. 
 31. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 
945 (1987). 
 32. Id. at 948.  Professor Aleinikoff contrasted this ad hoc balancing with the concept 
of “definitional” balancing.  Id.  In ad hoc balancing, the act of balancing itself is the con-
stitutional principle, whereas definitional balancing “establishes a substantive constitution-
al principle of general application . . . .”  Id.  Because of these conceptual differences, a 
definitional balancing opinion produces a holding that can be applied in later, factually 
similar cases, without the need to perform the balancing test again; by contrast, an ad hoc 
balancing opinion is factually specific, and the balancing must be performed separately 
each time the issue arises.  Id.  Professor Aleinikoff considered the holding in New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), an example of a definitional balancing test, because the hold-
ing “that the distribution of child pornography is not protected by the First Amend-
ment . . . may be applied in subsequent cases without additional balancing.”  Id.  For an 
example of an ad hoc balancing test, see infra note 37.   
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events,” but balancing tests “focus . . . directly on the interests or fac-
tors themselves.  Each interest seeks recognition on its own and forces 
a head-to-head comparison with competing interests.”33 
The Supreme Court has frequently applied ad hoc balancing 
tests in cases that raised a governmental interest on one side and one 
of myriad individual constitutional rights on the other.34  A compre-
hensive overview of the different kinds of cases in which balancing has 
been employed to weigh competing interests is beyond the scope of 
this Note.  Briefly, however, the Court has employed balancing tests in 
cases implicating various individual rights, from the First Amendment 
right of free association35 to the Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.36  The Court has also 
evaluated the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial through bal-
ancing.37  Similarly, balancing tests have been used in procedural due 
process38 and substantive due process39 cases. 
 
 33. Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 945.  Although Professor Aleinikoff’s definitions pro-
vide guidance for the kind of balancing test called for in this Note, he recognized that bal-
ancing tests are not without their pitfalls.  For example, he noted the difficulties in devel-
oping “the scale needed to translate the value of interests into a common currency for 
comparison” and recognized that the Supreme Court “spent surprisingly little time explor-
ing the difficult analytic and operational problems the method presents.”  Id. at 972–73.   
 34. See id. at 965–72 (providing examples and analysis of how balancing tests were ap-
plied in cases arising from the Bill of Rights).  As Professor Aleinikoff noted, while the tra-
ditional conception of balancing tests weighs governmental interests against individual in-
terests, balancing was used in other situations as well, including conflicts between two 
governmental interests and conflicts where the government is not involved at all.  Id. at 
947. 
 35. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (balancing the indi-
vidual’s right to not disclose his membership in the Communist Party with the govern-
ment’s interest in investigating communist activities within the United States). 
 36. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (calling for a balancing test in spe-
cific types of search situations, where the government can articulate specific facts that war-
rant an intrusion into individual privacy); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209–
10 (1979) (characterizing Terry as setting out a balancing test within a special area of 
Fourth Amendment seizures). 
 37. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972) (setting out an ad hoc bal-
ancing test by looking to the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant to de-
termine whether the right to a speedy trial was violated). 
 38. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976) (setting forth a balanc-
ing test, which requires consideration of three factors, to determine whether the govern-
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The Court has applied a balancing test when an individual’s lib-
erty and interest in bodily integrity were at stake.  In Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health,40 for example, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the conflict between the right to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatments and the state’s asserted interests in preserving life.41  The 
right to refuse medical treatment was grounded both in common law 
and in the Constitution, specifically in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.42  Forced medical treatment violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment by impinging upon the individual’s liberty 
interest in his own body.43  The Court then endorsed a balancing test 
in the context of refusing life-saving medical treatment when it stated: 
“[D]etermining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due 
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; ‘whether respondent’s con-
stitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing 
his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.’”44  To over-
come the individual’s interest in not being forcibly subjected to medi-
cal treatment, the state needed to prove its interest by clear and con-
vincing evidence.45  This particular standard of proof was adopted 
 
ment was required to provide a hearing pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause before terminating Social Security benefits). 
 39. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319–21 (1982) (finding that the Court 
must balance individual liberty against “‘the demands of an organized society’” in deter-
mining whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated (quot-
ing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
 40. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 41. Id. at 270. 
 42. Id. at 271, 278; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).  This constitutional 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment was inferred in part from the Court’s de-
cision in the same term in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 
278.  For a discussion of the importance of Harper, see infra Part II.B. 
 43. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 279 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 
321).  The Court identified the state interest in this case as the interest in protecting and 
preserving human life.  Id. at 280. 
 45. See id. at 282 (approving Missouri’s use of the clear and convincing evidence stand-
ard by noting that “[t]his Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof—‘clear 
and convincing evidence’—when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are 
both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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because the individual and the state interests were seen as “particular-
ly important” and “substantial.”46 
B.  The Supreme Court Has Recognized an Individual’s Constitutionally 
Protected Liberty Interest in Not Being Forcibly Medicated and 
Extended That Right to Defendants Who Were Found Incompetent to 
Stand Trial 
The Supreme Court has considered state-sanctioned forcible 
medication in the context of criminal prosecution in a series of cases, 
each of which focused on a narrowly tailored group of individuals.47  
These decisions recognized an individual liberty interest on the one 
hand and a governmental interest on the other, but the Court never 
explicitly weighed these interests against each other.48  In its most re-
cent decision on the issue of forcible medication, the Court set out 
four factors that lower federal courts must consider when faced with a 
government request to forcibly medicate defendants who would oth-
erwise be incompetent to stand trial.49 
1.  The Supreme Court Has Provided  Constitutional Protections for 
Individuals Who Do Not Wish to Take Antipsychotic Medications 
In Washington v. Harper,50 the Supreme Court addressed whether 
Walter Harper, a mentally ill prisoner serving a sentence in a state 
prison, could be forcibly treated with antipsychotic medication against 
his will.51  The Court analyzed Harper’s desire to refuse medication in 
the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
 
 46. Id. at 282–83.  In Cruzan, the majority determined that Cruzan’s parents did not 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that their daughter wished to have hydration and 
nutrition withdrawn in the event that she entered a persistent vegetative state.  Id. at 284–
85.  Due to that lack of evidence, Missouri was not required to defer to the parents’ wishes 
and was allowed to continue Cruzan’s life support.  Id. at 286–87. 
 47. See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 48. See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 49. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 50. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 51. Id. at 213.  Harper was originally convicted of robbery and eventually had his pa-
role revoked after he assaulted two nurses in a Seattle hospital.  Id. at 213–14.  Although 
Harper had voluntarily taken antipsychotic medication during his original incarceration, 
upon his return to prison he refused to continue taking medication for manic-depressive 
disorder.  Id.  A prison physician sought to forcibly medicate Harper pursuant to the state 
of Washington’s special offender policy.  Id. at 214.   
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ment.52  Specifically, the majority articulated the individual’s “signifi-
cant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-
psychotic drugs.”53  The Due Process Clause was implicated in such 
situations because “[t]he forcible injection of medication into a non-
consenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with 
that person’s liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment.54  With this 
articulation of the individual’s interest, the Court found that Harper 
could be forcibly medicated because Washington’s policy satisfied the 
procedural and substantive demands imposed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.55 
The Supreme Court again addressed the forcible medication of 
criminal defendants in Riggins v. Nevada,56 this time in the context of 
a defendant, David Riggins, who claimed he was forcibly medicated 
with an antipsychotic drug during the course of his trial.57  The Court 
reaffirmed its finding in Harper that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
 
 52. Id. at 213. 
 53. Id. at 221. 
 54. Id. at 229. 
 55. Id. at 220, 222–23.  The Court articulated that the substantive due process issue 
concerned “what factual circumstances must exist before the State [of Washington] may 
administer antipsychotic drugs to [Harper] against his will,” and the procedural due pro-
cess aspect concerned whether “the State’s nonjudicial mechanisms used to determine the 
facts in a particular case are sufficient.”  Id. at 220.  Stated more generally, “‘[t]he substan-
tive issue involves a definition of th[e] protected Constitutional interest, as well as identifi-
cation of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it.  The 
procedural issue concerns the minimum procedures required by the Constitution for de-
termining that the individual’s liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular in-
stance.’”  Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 
(1982)).  The Court also recognized that the prison environment presented its own 
unique set of concerns that affected the substantive due process requirements the State of 
Washington had to satisfy before medication would be allowed.  Id. at 227. 
 56. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
 57. Id. at 129.  A jury convicted Riggins of murder and robbery, both with the use of a 
deadly weapon.  Id. at 131.  During his trial, Riggins moved the Clark County District Court 
for an order suspending the forced administration of two antipsychotic medications, but 
his motion was denied.  Id. at 130–31.  Although the district court did not offer any ra-
tionale for its decision, it presumably relied in part on oral testimony from three psychia-
trists.  See id. (describing the testimony of Drs. Master, Quass, and O’Gorman).  Riggins 
appealed his convictions, arguing in part that the forced administration of medication 
during his trial deprived him of his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Id. at 132–33. 
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Due Process Clause granted an individual a protected liberty interest 
in refusing forcible medication, and reiterated that that liberty inter-
est is particularly pronounced when the drugs are of the antipsychotic 
variety.58  The Riggins Court also recognized that individuals whom 
the state detains for trial retain constitutional rights59 and, as a result, 
the State of Nevada was required under the Fourteenth Amendment 
“to establish the need for [a particular antipsychotic] and the medical 
appropriateness of the drug” before forcing Riggins to continue tak-
ing antipsychotics during his trial.60  Although the Court declined to 
lay out specific substantive standards for the Nevada court to consider 
on remand, it reasoned that the state would have satisfied due process 
had it demonstrated both the medical appropriateness of forced med-
ication and the need, in the absence of alternative treatments, for 
medication to ensure the safety of Riggins and others around him.61   
2.  The Supreme Court Extended Constitutional Protections Against 
Forcibly Medicating Defendants Who Would Otherwise Be 
Incompetent to Stand Trial by Establishing a Four-Factor Test  
In Sell v. United States,62 defendant Charles Sell, who had been 
found mentally incompetent to stand trial, opposed the government’s 
motion to involuntarily medicate him on the grounds that forcible 
 
 58. Id. at 133–34.  The Court took particular notice of the effect of antipsychotic drugs 
on an individual’s liberty interest because “[t]he purpose of the drugs is to alter the chem-
ical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to changes . . . in his or her cognitive processes.  
While the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true 
that the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects.”  Harper, 494 U.S. at 229. 
 59. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.  Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, explicitly not-
ed that this case was different from Harper, where medication was ordered to render Har-
per not dangerous to himself or those around him, because it focused on forcible medica-
tion simply for the purposes of rendering Riggins competent to stand trial.  Id. at 140 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 60. Id. at 135 (majority opinion).  In the absence of such findings, the Court found 
that Riggins’ constitutional trial rights were impaired, and ordered that the judgment of 
the Nevada Supreme Court be reversed.  Id. at 137–38. 
 61. Id. at 135.  The Court noted that the ultimate problem in Riggins was that the dis-
trict court allowed forcible medication in the absence of any sort of findings regarding 
medical appropriateness, reasonable alternatives, safety, or other compelling considera-
tions.  Id. at 136.  
 62. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
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medication deprived him of his constitutional liberty guaranties.63  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the for-
cible administration of antipsychotic medication for the sole purpose 
of rendering Sell competent to stand trial deprived him of the consti-
tutional liberty to reject unwanted medical treatment.64  According to 
the Court, the government could forcibly medicate Sell for the sole 
purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial, but only in lim-
ited circumstances and “upon [the] satisfaction of [certain] condi-
tions.”65   
Looking to its previous decisions in Harper and Riggins, the Court 
found that the Constitution’s liberty protections logically extended to 
defendants whom the government wished to medicate in order to 
render them competent to stand trial.66  The government could, how-
ever, override that constitutional liberty interest “only if the treatment 
is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects 
that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of 
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further im-
portant governmental trial-related interests.”67  The Court intended 
this standard to provide guidance for forcible medication in compe-
tency cases, but still noted that forcible medication may be allowed 
only in rare cases.68 
 
 63. Id. at 171, 175.  Sell, described as a man with “a long and unfortunate history of 
mental illness,” was charged with attempted murder and several nonviolent offenses, in-
cluding insurance fraud, mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money laundering.  Id. at 169–
70.  Sell was found incompetent to stand trial after hospitalization and treatment at the 
United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners.  Id. at 170–71.  He refused to take the 
prescribed antipsychotic medications that would allegedly render him competent.  Id. at 
171.  A federal magistrate judge and the reviewing district court both ruled in favor of the 
government’s motion for forcible medication, although the district court disagreed with 
the magistrate’s finding that Sell was dangerous and needed to be medicated for his own 
safety and the safety of others.  Id. at 173–74.   
 64. Id. at 177.  The Court in Sell framed Sell’s liberty in terms of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s protections of due process, and did not frame the issue in Fourteenth Amendment 
terms.  Id.  The Court explicitly noted, however, that its earlier decisions in Harper and Rig-
gins guided its inquiry into the individual liberty issue.  Id. at 178–79.  As discussed above, 
Harper and Riggins framed the individual liberty interest in Fourteenth Amendment terms.  
See supra Part II.B.1. 
 65. Sell, 539 U.S. at 169. 
 66. Id. at 179. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 180. 
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The Sell Court broke down the required showing for forcible 
medication into four individual factors.69  First, a court “must find 
that important governmental interests are at stake,” which can be satis-
fied by a showing that the defendant was accused of a “serious” 
crime.70  Those important governmental interests, however, may be 
lessened by certain “[s]pecial circumstances.”71  Such special circum-
stances include the possibility that the defendant might be confined 
to an institution or the possibility that the defendant might receive 
credit toward his sentence for time already served in confinement.72  
Second, a court must consider whether “involuntary medication will 
significantly further those concomitant state interests.”73  To make this 
finding, the court must determine whether the antipsychotic drugs 
are “substantially likely to render the defendant competent,” while at 
the same time finding that the drugs chosen are “substantially unlike-
ly to have side effects” that would prevent the defendant from receiv-
ing a fair trial.74  Third, a court must consider whether “involuntary 
medication is necessary to further those [governmental] interests.”75  
Under this factor, the court must determine “that any alternative, less 
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same re-
sults” that could be achieved through medication.76  Finally, the court 
must find that the “administration of the drugs [would be] medically 
appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his 
medical condition.”77   
These four factors were designed to help lower federal courts de-
termine whether the government had an interest important enough 
to override the individual’s interest in not being forcibly medicated 
for competency purposes.78  The Court believed these four factors 
 
 69. Id. at 180–81. 
 70. Id. at 180.  The Court noted that for purposes of the forcible medication analysis, 
such a “serious” crime could be committed against either a person or property.  Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 181. 
 74. Id.  A defendant suffering from significant side effects might be unable to assist 
counsel in his own defense, resulting in a trial that is constitutionally unfair.  Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. (“[T]he court applying these standards is seeking to determine whether in-
voluntary administration of drugs is necessary significantly to further a particular govern-
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“should help [a court] make the ultimate constitutionally required 
judgment.”79  Specifically, the applying court should ask: Has “the 
Government, in light of the efficacy, the side effects, the possible al-
ternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular course of 
antipsychotic drug treatment, shown a need for that treatment suffi-
ciently important to overcome the individual’s protected interest in 
refusing it?”80  
C.  The Supreme Court Has Provided Lower Federal Courts with Little 
Guidance as to How the Four Sell Factors Should Be Applied and 
Analyzed in Practice 
Although the Sell decision defined the four factors explicitly,81 
the Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to apply those fac-
tors to Sell’s particular case, choosing instead to remand the case for 
further consideration in light of the new holding.82  In remanding, 
the Court did not address either the evidentiary standard or the 
standard of appellate review that should be applied in Sell-type cases.83  
Lower federal courts were therefore left to their own judgment in 
making such determinations and often looked to sister circuit courts 
for guidance.84  The Fourth Circuit became a leading force in clarify-
ing the Sell analysis.85 
 
mental interest, namely, the interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.”).  
The Court remarked that lower courts should not engage in an analysis of whether forci-
ble medication for competency purposes would be appropriate if forcible medication 
could be warranted for a different reason; for example, if an individual could be forcibly 
medicated under Harper’s dangerousness analysis, the court would not have to reach the 
competency inquiry.  Id. at 181–82. 
 79. Id. at 183. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 180–81. 
 82. See id. at 185–86 (providing a brief overview of how the district court touched upon 
the four Sell factors, but not applying the factors, and remanding the case). 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that 
“[t]he Supreme Court in Sell articulated neither a standard of proof for the Sell factors nor 
a standard of appellate review”). 
 84. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 85. See infra Part II.C.2. 
  
264 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:251 
1. The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals Generally Agree on the 
Evidentiary and Appellate Review Standards for Sell-Type Cases 
Because the Supreme Court did not provide evidentiary or appel-
late review standards, the lower federal courts were compelled to 
make their own choices; still, the federal circuits are now, by and 
large, in agreement about the appropriate standards.  The Second 
Circuit was the first circuit court to hear a Sell-type case when it heard 
United States v. Gomes,86 and it developed the standards that most cir-
cuits later adopted.  In Gomes, the Second Circuit adopted the clear 
and convincing standard of proof for all the Sell factors, based in part 
on the Supreme Court’s language in Riggins.87  Turning to the stand-
ards of appellate review, the Second Circuit reasoned that the gov-
ernment’s asserted interest in prosecution was a legal finding and re-
viewed it de novo, while the court considered the other three Sell 
factors “factual in nature” and therefore reviewed them for clear er-
ror.88   
When addressing the standards of proof and appellate review, 
other courts looked initially to Gomes, and nearly all adopted the same 
standards.89  To this point, a number of circuits have adopted the 
 
 86. 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 87. Id. at 160.  In making this evidentiary determination, the Gomes court likely focused 
on the language in Riggins v. Nevada that characterized the “administration of antipsychot-
ic medication [as] necessary to accomplish an essential state policy . . . .”  504 U.S. 127, 138 
(1992).  The Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper also called for “clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence” before allowing forcible medication.  494 U.S. 210, 228 (1990) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 88. Gomes, 387 F.3d at 160. 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 236, 240 (4th Cir. 2005) (looking to 
Gomes in developing its review standards); United States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835, 839–40 & 
n.2 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 901 (2011) (suggesting the use of the clear and 
convincing standard of proof at a Sell hearing and adopting explicitly de novo review of the 
governmental interest factor and clear error review of the other three factors); United 
States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 545–46, 551–52, 559 (6th Cir. 2008) (employing de novo re-
view of the governmental interest factor, adopting clear error review of at least two other 
Sell factors, and endorsing the clear and convincing standard of proof for all the Sell fac-
tors); United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 598–99 (3d Cir. 2008) (adopting de novo review 
of the first Sell factor, clear error review of the second Sell factor, and the clear and con-
vincing standard of proof for the second, third, and fourth Sell factors); United States v. 
Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2007) (using de novo review of the first 
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clear and convincing evidence standard.90  There is, however, a slight 
discrepancy in the appellate standard of review; the Tenth Circuit re-
views the first and second Sell factors de novo and reviews only the 
third and fourth factors for clear error.91  The Tenth Circuit is thus 
far the only circuit to review the Sell factors this way, and all other cir-
cuits that have addressed the issue generally follow Gomes. 
2. The Fourth Circuit Has Emerged as a Leading Force as Lower 
Federal Courts Attempted to Further Define How the Government 
Should Satisfy Each Sell Factor 
The Fourth Circuit was one of several circuit courts to address 
the application of the Sell factors multiple times.92  The court first ap-
plied the four Sell factors in United States v. Evans.93  It remanded the 
case to the district court for further proceedings after finding that the 
government did not adequately show that its proposed medication re-
gime was “medically appropriate” for Evans or would “significantly 
 
Sell factor and clear error review of the remaining Sell factors); United States v. Palmer, 507 
F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007)  (adopting the appellate standard of review set out in Gomes). 
 90. The First Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have yet to address the application of the 
Sell factors. 
 91. See United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 2005) (agreeing 
with the Gomes court that the governmental interest factor should be viewed as a question 
of law, but “expand[ing] the parameters of the legal question” to include the second fac-
tor as well). 
 92. The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue three times.  See United States v. Ruiz-
Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908 
(9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2005).  The 
Tenth Circuit also addressed the Sell issue repeatedly.  See United States v. Valenzuela-
Puentes, 479 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Morrison, 415 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2005).  Other circuits, however, 
only addressed the issue once.  See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 128 (2011); United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
 93. 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005).  Defendant Herbert Evans was accused of assault on a 
federal employee and of threatening to murder a federal judge but was found mentally 
incompetent to stand trial because he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic.  Id. at 
232.  After Evans refused treatment, the government moved, pursuant to Sell, to forcibly 
medicate him to render him competent for trial.  Id.  The United States District Court for 
the Western District of Virginia granted the motion after applying Sell’s four-part test, and 
Evans appealed.  Id. at 227, 232, 235. 
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further” its interest in prosecuting.94  The Evans court characterized 
the Sell holding overall as “a four-part showing” that the government 
must make to ensure it complied with the Constitution in seeking the 
forcible medication of an incompetent defendant.95  This four-part 
showing allowed the government to constitutionally “outweigh the de-
fendant’s liberty interest” in refusing medication.96  The Fourth Cir-
cuit then examined three of the four Sell factors and articulated the 
standards the government would be held to in a Sell-style case.97 
In applying the first Sell factor—whether the government had an 
important interest—the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s 
conclusion de novo.98  Specifically, to determine whether Evans was 
facing prosecution for a “serious” offense, the Fourth Circuit “fo-
cus[ed] on the maximum penalty authorized by statute,” and argued 
that such a focus “respects legislative judgments regarding the severity 
of the crime.”99  While it declined to specify a rule as to what statutory 
maximum would constitute a “serious” crime, the Fourth Circuit con-
ceded that an important governmental interest exists when the de-
fendant faces a maximum punishment of ten years or more.100  This 
important governmental interest was not mitigated by any of the spe-
cial circumstances discussed in Sell.101 
 
 94. Id. at 232. 
 95. Id. at 235. 
 96. Id. 
 97. The Fourth Circuit only addressed the first, second, and fourth Sell factors because 
Evans did not challenge the question of whether the government satisfied the third factor.  
Id. at 236 & n.4. 
 98. Id. at 236.  In choosing to review this factor as a matter of law, the Fourth Circuit 
followed the majority of other circuits.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 99. Evans, 404 F.3d at 237.  Notably, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected Evans’s argu-
ment that the “proper focus” in determining whether he was facing prosecution for a seri-
ous crime “should be on the sentence he was most likely to receive under the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”  Id.  While the Fourth Circuit admitted that a probable sentencing guideline 
range would show respect to legislative judgment about serious crimes, it rejected Evans’s 
argument on the grounds that looking to the guidelines “would simply be unworkable be-
cause at this stage in the proceedings, there is no way of accurately predicting what that 
range will be.”  Id. at 237–38.   
 100. Id. at 238. 
 101. Id. at 239.  Specifically, the Fourth Circuit recognized that Evans was unlikely to be 
civilly committed.  Id.  Additionally, although Evans was incarcerated for over two years 
while awaiting trial, the court noted that “while the length of Evans’s confinement for 
evaluation may lessen the importance of the state’s interest, it does not defeat it.”  Id. 
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Considering them findings of fact, the Fourth Circuit reviewed 
the district court’s findings on the second and fourth Sell factors for 
clear error.102  The court held that the government did not supply ad-
equate information to satisfy the factors in question.103  The primary 
failing, as related to the “significantly further” and “medically appro-
priate” factors, was that the involuntarily medicated report (“IM re-
port”) filed in the lower court proceedings failed to identify which an-
tipsychotic drugs doctors planned to use to restore Evans to 
competency.104  The Fourth Circuit specifically stated that to establish 
the medical appropriateness of its forcible medication request, “[t]he 
government must propose a course of treatment in which it specifies 
the particular drug to be administered.”105  The IM report’s failure to 
address the possible side effects of any specific drugs contributed to 
the government’s failure to satisfy the “medically appropriate” Sell fac-
tor.106  In short, “[w]ithout at least describing the proposed course of 
treatment, it is tautological that the Government cannot satisfy its 
burden of showing anything with regards to that treatment, much less 
that it will ‘significantly further’ the Government’s trial-related inter-
ests and be ‘medically appropriate’ for Evans.”107 
The government’s second major stumbling block regarding the 
second and fourth factors was the IM report’s failure to analyze Evans 
as an individual.108  Nothing in the IM report explained how antipsy-
chotic medication would be appropriate for Evans’ specific physiolo-
gy.109  Instead, the IM report “simply set[] up syllogisms to explain its 
 
 102. Id. at 240. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 233, 240. 
 105. Id. at 240.  The IM report filed in support of the government’s motion only refer-
enced second-generation, or atypical, antipsychotic medications but mentioned none by 
name.  Id. at 233.  The report filed in support of forcible medication also did not discuss 
the rationale behind the doctors’ conclusions that medication would render Evans compe-
tent.  Id. at 233–34. 
 106. Id. at 240. 
 107. Id.  For a discussion of how the Fourth Circuit analyzed the second and fourth Sell 
factors as parts of a single unit, as opposed to individual factors to be established inde-
pendently, see infra Part IV.C. 
 108. Evans, 404 F.3d at 240–41. 
 109. Id. at 240.  For example, the IM report “nowhere addressed [a psychiatrist’s] con-
cern that Evans’s delusions of governmental conspiracies that have persisted longer than 
40 years will resist involuntary medication precisely because the government administers 
the medication.”  Id. at 241.  The IM report also did not address how Evans, “an elderly 
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conclusions” that, if accepted in this case, would have allowed the 
government to satisfy the second and fourth Sell factors by asserting 
that antipsychotics were generally effective and medically appropriate 
for most people.110  Thus, to satisfy the second and fourth Sell factors 
in the Fourth Circuit, the government must describe its proposed 
treatment plan and all other relevant circumstances as they relate to 
the specific facts of an individual case.111 
The Fourth Circuit once again addressed the Sell factors in United 
States v. Bush.112  In that case, the court explicitly adopted the clear 
and convincing evidence standard when considering cases under Sell, 
and remanded the case to the district court on the grounds that the 
government did not provide enough evidence to satisfy the demand-
ing second and fourth factors.113  The court also revisited the first fac-
tor and any potentially undermining special circumstances but up-
held the district court’s finding that the government had an 
 
man with diabetes, hypertension, and asthma,” might experience any potential side effects 
of antipsychotic medication.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 241. 
 111. Id. at 242.  Any report filed in support of the second and fourth Sell factors in the 
Fourth Circuit must therefore discuss any potential side effects as they relate to a particu-
lar defendant, describe a plan to deal with those potential side effects, and explain why 
those side effects are “substantially unlikely” to interfere with the defendant’s ability to as-
sist counsel in preparing his defense.  Id.  The report must also “provide the estimated 
time the proposed treatment plan will take to restore the defendant’s competence and the 
criteria it will apply when deciding when to discontinue the treatment,” and explain why 
medication is overall more beneficial to the defendant than refusing the medication would 
be.  Id.  This is a more stringent standard than that adopted in other circuits.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1114–15 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that the gov-
ernment met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that its proposed treatment was 
medically appropriate, even though the testifying doctor spoke in general about antipsy-
chotic medications).   
 112. 585 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2009).  Defendant Barbara Bush, who suffered from Delu-
sional Disorder, Persecutory Type, was charged with threatening a federal judge but was 
found mentally incompetent to stand trial.  Id. at 809.  Because psychiatrists believed she 
could be restored to competence with antipsychotics, the government sought to forcibly 
medicate Bush after she refused treatment.  Id.  The United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland granted the government’s motion.  Id. at 806, 809. 
 113. Id. at 809, 814, 817–18. 
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important interest that was not mitigated.114  In affirming the district 
court’s finding that no special circumstances existed, the court stated 
that “[e]ven though Bush can make a serious argument that the time 
she has already served in prison is sufficiently long to cover, or almost 
cover, any sentence that reasonably could be anticipated, this fact 
alone does not defeat [the government’s interest].”115 
The Fourth Circuit, however, found that the government failed 
to meet the evidentiary burden to show that forcible medication 
would be substantially likely to render Bush competent while also be-
ing in her best medical interest.116  The court again emphasized that 
the government must demonstrate how a specific medication is likely 
to work on a specific defendant.117  Because the Evans decision, which 
set out this individualized analysis, failed to establish a corresponding 
evidentiary standard, the Bush district court allowed medication un-
der the second Sell factor without the appropriate amount of evidence 
needed to satisfy the newly adopted clear and convincing evidence 
standard.118  The district court also failed to address whether medica-
tion would be in Bush’s best medical interest, even though reports 
filed in support of Bush’s forcible medication did not specify a specif-
ic drug, a specific dosage, or a specific plan to deal with side effects.119  
In so deciding, the district court contravened both the holding in Ev-
ans and the new evidentiary standard adopted by the Fourth Cir-
cuit.120 
 
 114. Id. at 814–15.  Bush acknowledged that her charged crimes carried a ten-year max-
imum.  Id. at 814.  Yet, based on the Sentencing Guidelines and governmental conces-
sions, she argued she would only be sentenced to time served.  Id.  
 115. Id. at 815 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116. Id. at 815–18. 
 117. Id. at 816.  In this case, Bush’s particular psychotic disorder presented some uncer-
tainty as to whether medication could reverse her condition.  Id.  This uncertainty was in-
cluded in the record through the testimony of two different doctors, each with a different 
opinion as to the potential success of antipsychotics on Bush.  Id. 
 118. Id. at 816–17. 
 119. Id. at 817. 
 120. Id. at 817–18.  Admittedly, the report in Bush was more specific than the report in 
Evans. The government identified three specific medications that were being considered, 
even indicating a preference for one drug above the other two, and they provided a plan 
for forcible injection every two weeks.  Id. at 817.  No dosages, however, were provided in 
the reports, and the district court “did not guide or limit the medical staff’s discretion” as 
to dosages.  Id.  The proposed forcible medication plan also failed to account for Bush’s 
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The Fourth Circuit’s application of the Sell factors influenced the 
forcible medication analysis in other circuits.  For example, the Elev-
enth Circuit implicitly adopted the finding in Evans that the govern-
ment should submit a personalized treatment plan with dosages and 
possible side effects when arguing that its medication regime is sub-
stantially likely to render the defendant competent.121  The Ninth Cir-
cuit also explicitly adopted the reasoning in Evans when it found that 
a Sell analysis would not be satisfied if the government simply drew 
“direct inference[s]” that forcible medication would render a specific 
defendant competent from “general proposition[s]” that antipsychot-
ic medications were usually effective.122  In that same decision, the 
Ninth Circuit also cited Bush when noting “the weakness of evidence 
that antipsychotic medication is successful in treating Delusional Dis-
order.”123  Similarly, both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits looked to 
Evans when determining what constituted a “serious crime” in the Sell 
analysis, although only one of those circuits agreed with the Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis.124  These cases suggest that the Fourth Circuit’s ap-
plication and understanding of the Sell factors significantly influenced 
other appellate courts and that the court is a leader in this area of the 
law. 
 
diabetes and for how any side effects might affect that condition, an omission that went 
against the holding in Evans.  Id. at 817–18.   
 121. See United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1334 (11th Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 
128 (2011) (noting with approval the testifying doctor’s personalized medication plan and 
contrasting that plan to Evans, where no specific dosage plan was submitted). 
 122. United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 700 (9th Cir. 2010).  The Ninth Circuit 
cited extensively to Evans and noted that, “[l]ike the Fourth Circuit, ‘[w]e do not believe 
that Sell’s analysis permits such deference.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 
227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
 123. Id. at 701 n.11. 
 124. Compare United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Evans, but ultimately “disagree[ing] with the 
Fourth Circuit and conclud[ing] that the likely guideline range is the appropriate starting 
point for the analysis of a crime’s seriousness”), with United States v. Valenzuela-Puentes, 
479 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (agreeing with the Evans court that the seriousness of 
a crime “relates to the possible penalty the defendant faces if convicted, as well as the na-
ture or effect of the underlying conduct for which he was charged”).  Other circuits have 
cited Evans when determining the seriousness of an offense.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Green, 532 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Evans and considering “both the potential 
statutory penalty and the potential Guideline range” to determine the seriousness of a 
crime). 
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III.  THE COURT’S REASONING  
In United States v. White, the Fourth Circuit held that the govern-
ment could not forcibly medicate Kimberly White for the sole pur-
pose of rendering her competent to stand trial.125  Writing for the ma-
jority, Judge Davis reasoned that the government did not show a 
sufficiently important interest in prosecuting White that would over-
ride her constitutionally protected liberty interest in not being forci-
bly medicated.126   
Judge Davis reiterated that the four-factor Sell test governed the 
conflict between the government’s interest in prosecuting crime and 
the defendant’s liberty interest in not being forcibly medicated for 
the purpose of being made competent to stand trial.127  Considering 
the first Sell factor, Judge Davis weighed the government’s interest in 
prosecuting White against any special circumstances that might miti-
gate that interest.128  He deemed this factor dispositive and found that 
the government’s interest did not overcome the special circumstances 
present in White’s case.129  In determining whether special circum-
stances undermined the government’s interest in prosecuting White, 
Judge Davis considered: the amount of time White spent, and would 
likely spend, in confinement before her trial could begin; the nature 
of her crime; the fact that her confinement would preclude her from 
certain activities that would threaten public safety; her unique medi-
cal condition; and whether the case against White was sufficiently ex-
ceptional to allow the government to forcibly medicate her.130   
After considering how much time White spent in confinement, 
and determining what her sentence might be if convicted, Judge Da-
 
 125. 620 F.3d 401, 410, 422 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 126. Id. at 404, 410.   
 127. Id. at 409–10; see also supra note 18 (discussing the four-factor Sell test). 
 128. White, 620 F.3d at 410. 
 129. Id.  Although Judge Davis recognized that White’s charged crimes were serious, he 
noted that the government’s interest in prosecuting even serious crimes can be mitigated 
when special circumstances are present.  Id. at 411.  The Fourth Circuit considers crimes 
serious when the defendant faces a maximum sentence of ten years in prison.  Id. at 410.   
 130. Id. at 413.  When the Fourth Circuit previously considered the issue of special cir-
cumstances in involuntary medication cases, it examined: “(1) the possibility that the de-
fendant might be confined to an institution for the mentally ill . . . ; (2) the potential for 
future confinement should the defendant regain competence; and (3) the fact that the 
defendant . . . [might] receive credit toward any sentence imposed [for time served].”  Id. 
at 411 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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vis found that White’s time in pretrial detention would “have extend-
ed considerably longer than her likely sentence,” a fact that substantially 
weakened the government’s interest in prosecuting White.131  In mak-
ing this determination, Judge Davis estimated that White’s likely pris-
on sentence would range between forty-two and fifty-one months, 
based in part on the sentence imposed on White’s codefendant and 
the median and mean sentences that local and national courts had 
imposed on other defendants charged with similar crimes.132  Alt-
hough the estimation that White already served a significant portion 
of her likely sentence substantially weakened the government’s inter-
est in prosecuting her, Judge Davis indicated that White needed to 
show additional special circumstances to completely mitigate the gov-
ernment’s interest.133  Noting that “[n]ot every serious crime is equal-
ly serious,” the majority emphasized that White’s crimes were nonvio-
lent and committed against property, not people.134  This 
 
 131. Id. at 418–19.  Judge Davis noted that from the time of her arrest in March 2007 to 
the time her appeal was heard in August 2010, White was already confined for forty-one 
months.  Id. at 414.  He estimated that if White was forcibly medicated, she would spend 
an additional four months in detention before regaining competence to stand trial, result-
ing in forty-five months in confinement before her trial could begin.  Id.  If White chose to 
appeal an unfavorable decision to the Supreme Court, she would spend at least another 
six months in confinement while waiting for her petition for certiorari to be granted or 
denied, resulting in fifty-one months of confinement before her trial could begin.  Id.  If 
White was brought to trial and found guilty, she would be awarded approximately 6.7 
months of good conduct credits, resulting in 57.7 months of confinement.  Id. at 415.   
 132. Id. at 415–18.  Judge Davis noted that the court also could have calculated White’s 
likely sentence based on the federal advisory sentencing guidelines, but that the court 
could look to codefendants and national average sentences if it could not find the appro-
priate sentencing guidelines.  Id. at 415.  In coming to his anticipated sentence of forty-two 
to fifty-one months, Judge Davis noted that White’s codefendant, Vonda Machelle Baker, 
received a thirty-six-month sentence “for substantially the same relevant conduct in which 
White [was] alleged to have engaged.”  Id. at 416, 418.  He also considered that, nationally, 
defendants convicted of fraud tended to serve no prison time and that the Fourth Circuit 
tended to issue nonprison sentences for fraud.  Id. at 416–17.  Finally, Judge Davis referred 
to data from the United States Sentencing Commission and noted that the median sen-
tence for fraud charges was eighteen months.  Id. at 417. 
 133. Id. at 419. 
 134. Id.  
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distinguished White’s case from Evans and Bush.135  Judge Davis rea-
soned that White’s confinement in a mental hospital would prevent 
her from ever owning a handgun, thus addressing the concern that 
White could be a danger to the public without prosecution.136  He al-
so noted that White’s medical condition made it difficult to predict 
with certainty whether she could be restored to competence and 
what, if any, side effects she would experience as a result of involun-
tary medication.137  Finally, Judge Davis concluded that White’s crimes 
were “not sufficiently exceptional” and that allowing forcible medica-
tion in her case would risk making forcible medication to restore 
competency a “routine” practice.138 
Judge Keenan wrote a concurring opinion, emphasizing that the 
government must show an “overriding” or “essential” interest in pros-
ecuting a defendant before forcible medication can be allowed.139  
She reasoned that the government failed to meet that burden in 
White’s case.140  Although Judge Keenan did not estimate what 
White’s likely prison sentence might be if she was convicted, she rec-
ognized that White had been in custody for forty-one months, a “sig-
nificant period of time.”141  She also noted that White’s crimes were 
“entirely nonviolent” and that, although they were serious, the charg-
es were not exceptional enough to justify forcible medication.142 
 
 135. Id.; see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing United States v. Evans and United States v. 
Bush).  The majority also noted that prosecuting White would not provide her victims with 
any tangible benefit.  White, 620 F.3d at 419. 
 136. Id. at 420. 
 137. Id. at 420–21.  The majority distinguished between White’s diagnosis of Delusional 
Disorder, Grandiose Type and the diagnoses of patients in the Herbel study cited by Drs. 
Kempke and Powers.  Id.  In the Herbel study, only one of the twenty-two subjects had De-
lusional Disorder, Grandiose Type, and none of the subjects were female.  Id. at 421.  The 
majority therefore reasoned that the Herbel study outcome did not accurately predict how 
White would respond to similar medication.  Id. at 420–21.  Judge Davis also gave less 
weight to Dr. Kempke’s testimony regarding how White might respond to the recom-
mended medication because her expertise was in schizophrenia, not delusional disorders, 
and she never personally examined White.  Id. at 421.  
 138. Id. at 421–22.   
 139. Id. at 422 (Keenan, J., concurring). 
 140. Id. at 422.  
 141. Id. at 423. 
 142. Id. 
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In dissent, Judge Niemeyer asserted that the district court “care-
ful[ly]” and “thorough[ly]” reviewed and applied the four-factor Sell 
test in allowing White to be forcibly medicated.143  He believed that 
the Fourth Circuit should have deferred to the district court’s find-
ings.144  Judge Niemeyer characterized the majority’s assessment of 
White’s likely sentence as “rank speculation” and stated that the court 
had conducted an “unprecedented and unsupportable” sentencing 
hearing without the benefit of a presentence report or the necessary 
facts.145  Taking issue with the majority’s conclusion that the nonvio-
lent nature of White’s offenses reduced the seriousness of her crimes, 
Judge Niemeyer argued that the Supreme Court in Sell did not distin-
guish between crimes committed against a person and those against 
property.146  Judge Niemeyer finally noted that a trial would have 
permitted the government to publicly confront White with the allega-
tions against her, which could serve as a deterrent to others who 
might commit similar crimes, and that a criminal conviction would 
have allowed the government to fully punish White for her crimes by 
subjecting her to a period of supervised release and requiring her to 
pay restitution to her victims.147 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In United States v. White, the Fourth Circuit missed an opportunity 
to apply the four Sell factors as elements of a constitutional balancing 
test, choosing instead to complicate the Sell inquiry by performing a 
conjectural sentencing analysis.  A balancing test would have support-
 
 143. Id. at 424 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 424, 428.  A sentencing judge would ordinarily consider a presentence report 
that includes White’s criminal history and definitions of the relevant conduct of the 
charged crimes.  Id.  In a sentencing hearing, the government would be permitted to in-
troduce evidence of White’s criminal conduct that was not included in the indictment and 
other evidence that might justify enhancing White’s sentence.  Id.  Judge Niemeyer disap-
proved of the majority’s failure to address the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in estimating 
White’s probable sentence and noted that White’s coconspirator had been cooperative 
and had only faced two counts in contrast to White’s six.  Id.  Judge Niemeyer also stressed 
that courts of appeals cannot conduct sentencing proceedings and criminal sentences 
cannot be based on national averages for a broad class of fraud charges.  Id. at 429. 
 146. Id. at 430. 
 147. Id.  
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ed an individually focused analysis148 and should have been applied in 
a situation such as White’s, where individual liberty rights conflicted 
with governmental interests.149  Earlier Supreme Court decisions, in-
cluding Sell, set out the importance of individual interests in forcible 
medication cases and suggested that a balancing-style test could be 
appropriately applied.150  Other lower federal courts conducted Sell 
analyses in ways that suggested a balancing test could be easily adopt-
ed in the future.151  Instead of taking the opportunity to develop such 
a test, the Fourth Circuit in White overcomplicated the Sell analysis 
and seemingly contradicted its earlier decisions.152 
A.  Balancing Tests Are Well-Suited to Cases Where Individual and 
Governmental Interests Collide Because Such Tests Recognize the 
Importance of Both Interests 
Ad hoc balancing tests, as opposed to definitional balancing or 
categorical-style tests, are more appropriate for situations in which 
courts must take notice of an individual’s particular situation and 
characteristics when making their decisions.153  Courts can still suc-
cessfully apply a series of particular factors, like those outlined in Sell, 
in a balancing-style test if the factors are treated as elements to be 
considered rather than as sufficient conditions.154  To apply the Sell 
factors, however, most courts have employed a categorical-style test 
that cannot sufficiently account for the individual’s interests.155  For-
cible medication cases in particular are well-suited to balancing tests 
because of the extreme individual concerns involved.156 
 
 148. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 149. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 150. See infra Part IV.B. 
 151. See infra Part IV.C. 
 152. See infra Part IV.D. 
 153. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 154. See infra notes 176–179 and accompanying text. 
 155. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 156. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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1. Balancing Tests May Not Produce Consistent, Predictable Results, 
but Their Fact-Intensive Analysis Is Appropriate When Individual 
Rights and Governmental Interests Are Concerned 
This Note advocates for an ad hoc balancing test157 that focuses 
on the interests at stake in a particular case, with attention to the facts 
involved, and weighs those competing interests against each other to 
reach a final decision.158  It is necessary to acknowledge that courts 
might be reluctant to employ ad hoc balancing tests because of their 
labor-intensive nature, especially when multi-factor tests, or even def-
initional balancing tests, provide possible alternatives.159  Beyond the 
initial effort of applying a balancing test each time a particular issue 
comes before the court, this kind of analysis also requires courts to 
develop ways to weigh and measure disparate, conceptual interests 
against each other.160  In addition, because the balancing test requires 
that a fact-specific analysis occur each time the interests compete,161 
the balancing test is unlikely to yield predictable results. 
Balancing tests, which outline general standards that must be set 
against each other, are commonly contrasted against “categorical” 
type tests, which focus more on setting down rules.162  As Professor 
Kathleen M. Sullivan explains:  
 
 157. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra Part II.A. 
 159. See supra Part II.A.  
 160. See Aleinikoff, supra note 31, at 945–46 (explaining the balancing analysis). 
 161. See id. at 946 (illustrating how the balancing test applies to a particular case). 
 162. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balanc-
ing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293–94 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging] 
(explaining the difference between balancing rhetoric and categorization rhetoric); Jo-
seph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 375, 381–82 (2009) (explaining the difference between categoricalism and balanc-
ing in constitutional jurisprudence).  Sullivan also noted that there is a subtle difference 
between categorization and the establishment of a judicial rule: “A legal directive is ‘rule’-
like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of de-
limited triggering facts,” while a categorization method creates standards instead of rules, 
“allow[s] the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the 
circumstances,” and permits the decision-maker to reach different results when different 
facts are presented.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–59 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan, Rules and Standards].  “The recurring 
distinction in constitutional law between ‘categorization’ and ‘balancing’ [therefore] is a 
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Categorization and balancing each employ quite different 
rhetoric.  Categorization is the taxonomist’s style—a job of 
classification and labeling.  When categorical formulas oper-
ate, all the important work in litigation is done at the outset.  
Once the relevant right and mode of infringement have 
been described, the outcome follows, without any explicit 
judicial balancing of the claimed right against the govern-
ment’s justification for the infringement.  Balancing is more 
like grocer’s work (or Justice’s)—the judge’s job is to place 
competing rights and interests on a scale and weigh them 
against each other.  Here the outcome is not determined at 
the outset, but depends on the relative strength of a multi-
tude of factors.  These two styles have competed endlessly in 
contemporary constitutional law; neither has ever entirely 
eclipsed the other.163 
Each style of decision-making has advantages and disadvantages.  
Those who advocate for rules and categorizations argue that such tests 
promote judicial consistency, uniformity, and predictability in deci-
sion-making.164  Categorization also prevents the effect of a judge’s 
own biases from influencing his decision by structuring the decision 
around clearly identified constraints.165  By contrast, balancing tests 
“spare individuals from being sacrificed on the altar of rules” by high-
lighting the relevant similarities and differences between parties and 
cases.166  Judges are permitted to apply flexible standards to changing 
circumstances and can reach different decisions over time.167  Balanc-
ing tests also make judges more accountable for their decisions; by 
requiring judges to explain the reasons behind their substantive deci-
sions, these tests help develop legal principles.168 
The differences between balancing tests and categorizations 
“mark a continuum, not a divide,”169 which suggests that a transition 
 
version of the rules/standards distinction,” where balancing reflects standards and catego-
rization reflects rules.  Id. at 59–60. 
 163. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging, supra note 162, at 293–94.   
 164. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 65. 
 165. Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional 
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 283 (1995). 
 166. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 66. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Chen, supra note 165, at 283. 
 169. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 61. 
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from a categorization test to a balancing test is not jurisprudentially 
impossible.  Arguably, most of the courts to address the Sell factors did 
so in a categorical style, where the government’s ability to satisfy each 
factor was considered enough to allow forcible medication without 
any further inquiry into the individual’s interest.170  Comparing the 
benefits and problems equated with both methods, however, suggests 
that categorization does not work as effectively as a balancing test 
would in the realm of forcible medication.  Categorization “prohibits 
the reweighing of interests” once the rules are developed171 and pre-
vents judges from considering the particular qualities of each party in 
making their decisions.172  By definition, categorization demands that 
judges treat all cases of the same type exactly alike;173 however, forci-
ble medication analyses have required courts to focus on the individ-
ual to be medicated and the specific course of treatment for that spe-
cific purpose.174  Because the forcible medication analysis will con-
constantly change depending on the individual’s specific diagnosis 
and susceptibility to side effects, categorization’s inability to adapt to 
changing circumstances is ill-suited to the task.  The increased ac-
countability of a standards-based balancing test is also necessary when 
judges are charged with making decisions that affect an individual’s 
mental processes and physical health.175  In short, what would be sac-
rificed in terms of consistency and predictability by treating the Sell 
factors as standards in an overall balancing test—instead of parts of a 
categorical rule—would be countered by an increased ability to focus 
on individual characteristics of the defendants and clearer judicial 
explanations for why medication was permitted or denied. 
The right to avoid forcible medication is an individual right im-
portant enough that courts should be compelled to undertake a bal-
ancing test, despite its difficult and nuanced application.  In the past, 
the Supreme Court actually rejected a bright-line rule for determin-
ing whether the government’s interests can override an individual’s 
 
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing the 
Sell factors as “a four-part analysis to be conducted by the district court when determining 
whether involuntary medication may be utilized to render a defendant competent to stand 
trial”). 
 171. Blocher, supra note 162, at 382. 
 172. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 62. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005) (requiring courts 
to consider defendants facing forcible medication on an individualized basis). 
 175. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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constitutional rights in favor of a more flexible balancing test.176  In 
Barker v. Wingo,177 the Court developed an ad hoc balancing test that 
applied in situations where the individual right to a speedy trial under 
the Sixth Amendment was allegedly violated, and in doing so, out-
lined four factors for a court to consider in determining whether the 
individual had been deprived of his right.178  The Court noted: 
 We regard none of the four factors identified above as ei-
ther a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a 
deprivation of the right of speedy trial.  Rather, they are re-
lated factors and must be considered together with such 
other circumstances as may be relevant.  In sum, these fac-
tors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in 
a difficult and sensitive balancing process.179   
The same analysis and reasoning could easily be applied to the 
four Sell factors and to the individual right to be free from forcible 
medication with antipsychotic drugs.  Such an interpretation of the 
Sell factors would help courts compare the individual and governmen-
tal interests at stake in a forcible medication case without reducing 
the inquiry to a mere checklist of steps the government must fulfill 
before medication will be allowed. 
2.  A Balancing Test is Particularly Appropriate in the Context of 
Forcible Medication 
It is well-settled law that the individual’s interest in liberty, in-
cluding the liberty to treat his body how he wishes in the medical con-
text, is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.180  The right to choose medical treatment, or to avoid 
treatment altogether, is so critical because it can affect an individual’s 
very existence.181  This liberty interest becomes especially important in 
 
 176. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972). 
 177. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).  
 178. Id. at 530.  The four factors identified by the Court were the length of the delay 
before the trial began, the government’s reasons for the delay, the defendant’s personal 
responsibility to assert his Sixth Amendment right, and any prejudice to the defendant re-
sulting from delay.  Id. at 530–32.  
 179. Id. at 533 (citation omitted). 
 180. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (affirming 
the Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse unwanted medical treatment). 
 181. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663–64 (N.J. 1976), overruled by In re Conroy, 486 
A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (recognizing that an individual might knowingly choose to discon-
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the forcible medication context, because unwanted treatment with 
antipsychotic drugs is designed to have a profound effect on the indi-
vidual’s physiology without affording the individual the right to 
choose that effect on his own.182  The purpose of antipsychotic medi-
cation is “to alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain, leading to 
changes . . . in his or her cognitive processes.”183  Besides fundamen-
tally altering an individual’s brain chemistry, these drugs can also 
cause a variety of side effects, ranging from the (comparatively be-
nign) risks of elevated body weight and cholesterol levels184 to the 
risks of irreversible muscle twitches (tardive dyskinesia) and possible 
death from cardiac malfunction (as a result of neuroleptic malignant 
syndrome).185   
These are severe effects, intended and potential, for any individ-
ual to face, but the individual who wishes to take these medications 
voluntarily has at least made his own choice in the context of his own 
liberty interest in his own body.  Before imposing these effects on an 
individual who did not wish to take antipsychotic medication at all, 
the law should require the government to make an extremely strong 
case demonstrating why it could not yield to the individual’s liberty 
interest in keeping his own body and mind free from such fundamen-
tal changes.186  An ad hoc balancing test that places the government’s 
specific interest in trying a specific defendant against that defendant’s 
interest in being free from a specific antipsychotic medical regimen, 
including an analysis of the potential side effects that individual might 
face, would give the necessary respect and deference to the individu-
 
tinue medication, even if that choice meant hastening her own death, and finding that the 
right to privacy would protect such an informed choice). 
 182. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229–30 (1990) (describing the potential 
effects of antipsychotic medication). 
 183. Id. at 229. 
 184. See United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 408 (4th Cir. 2010) (describing some po-
tential effects of second-generation antipsychotics). 
 185. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 230 (describing potential, although rare, side effects of anti-
psychotic medications in general). 
 186. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1992) (describing some of the possible 
serious side effects of antipsychotics and emphasizing that forcing such drugs onto an in-
dividual absent “overriding justification” is unconstitutional). 
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al’s compelling interest, while allowing the government to prevail in 
certain rare cases.187 
B.  Sell and its Predecessors Never Explicitly Ruled Out a Balancing Test, 
and the Structure of the Sell Factors Could Lend Itself to a Balancing 
Format with Little Difficulty 
The Supreme Court cases before Sell that addressed forcible 
medication suggested that a balancing-style test could be appropriate-
ly applied to contrast individual rights against government interests.188  
Furthermore, nothing in the language of Sell indicated that the Court 
would have disapproved of a balancing test to implement its four fac-
tors.189  The Sell factors as they stand now could be modified to fit a 
balancing-style test, which would more effectively consider the gov-
ernment’s interest in prosecuting crime and the individual’s liberty 
interest in avoiding forcible medication.190 
1. Harper and Riggins Established the Importance of the Individual 
and Government Interests, and Required That Courts Consider 
Both in the Forcible Medication Analysis 
The Supreme Court in Sell explicitly looked to Harper and Riggins 
as “set[ting] forth the framework for determining the legal answer” to 
whether an individual awaiting trial could be forcibly medicated.191  
Both cases characterized the individual’s interest in avoiding forced 
administration of medication as a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest.192  Specifically, the Court in Harper classified that liberty in-
 
 187. Such a test would also respect the mandate in Sell that forcible medication for the 
purposes of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial ought to be allowed only in 
“rare” instances.  Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). 
 188. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 189. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 190. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 191. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178–79.  
 192. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 
221–22 (1990).  The Sell Court accepted this constitutional liberty interest without specify-
ing which amendment was implicated in the forcible medication analysis.  Sell, 539 U.S. at 
179.  In contrast, both Harper and Riggins grounded that right in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134; Harper, 494 U.S. at 221–22.  The liberty protections offered 
to an individual under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses, how-
ever, are equivalent, suggesting that the Sell Court could discuss the individual’s constitu-
tional liberty right in avoiding forcible medication without grounding it specifically in ei-
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terest as “significant,” and it had to be evaluated against “both the le-
gitimacy and the importance of the governmental interest present-
ed . . . .”193  The Riggins Court instead required a finding of an “essen-
tial state policy” or an “overriding justification” before forcible 
medication could be considered; without such a finding, forcible 
medication would be an “impermissible” infringement on individual 
liberty.194  Although neither Harper nor Riggins explicitly called for 
balancing the individual and governmental interests, the characteriza-
tion of the individual’s liberty interest as “significant” and as standing 
in opposition to the government’s interest set out the issue in a bal-
ancing-appropriate format.  Furthermore, the Court in Riggins found 
that the state courts had committed reversible error because they “did 
not acknowledge the defendant’s liberty interest in freedom from 
unwanted antipsychotic drugs” before allowing forcible medication, 
implying that both the individual’s interest and the government’s in-
terests must be evaluated concurrently in such situations.195 
2. Sell Suggested That Individual Liberty Must Remain an 
Important Consideration in Forcible Medication Cases, and 
Further Indicated That Courts Could Use the Four Factors in a 
Balancing-Style Test 
The Sell Court, before setting out the standard for forcible medi-
cation of a defendant who has yet to stand trial, explicitly reiterated 
both the individual liberty interest set forth in Harper and Riggins and 
the need for the government to show a very significant interest of its 
own before being allowed to medicate.196  Thus, the Court made clear 
at the outset that both sets of interests would need to be considered in 
 
ther the state or the federal realm.  See John F. Basiak, Jr., The Roberts Court and the Future of 
Substantive Due Process: The Demise of “Split-the-Difference” Jurisprudence?, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 
861, 866 & n.34 (2007) (explaining that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Pro-
cess Clauses offer identical liberty protections). 
 193. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221, 225. 
 194. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 138. 
 195. Id. at 135–37.  Indeed, the Riggins Court reversed because the lower state courts 
did not make sufficient findings, including the finding that the state interest overrode 
Riggins’s liberty interest, to justify forced medication.  Id. at 129, 138. 
 196. Sell, 539 U.S. at 178–79.  In its recapitulation of Harper and Riggins, the Court vari-
ously characterized the government’s level of interest as “legitimate,” “important,” “essen-
tial,” and “overriding.”  Id. 
  
2012] UNITED STATES V. WHITE 283 
the forcible medication analysis it was about to undertake.197  Addi-
tionally, although the Court introduced the Sell factors by stating that 
the Constitution permits forcible medication “only if the treatment is 
medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects . . . 
and . . . is necessary significantly to further important governmental 
trial-related interests,”198 it never suggested that the satisfaction of 
those four factors was all that was required before forcible medication 
would be allowed.  On the contrary, viewing the satisfaction of the 
four Sell factors as the only roadblock to forcible medication works 
against the Court’s statement that “those instances [when medication 
is ordered] may be rare.”199 
Instead, the four Sell factors outlined by the Court were designed 
to help lower courts decide whether “the Government, in light of the 
efficacy, the side effects, the possible alternatives, and the medical ap-
propriateness of a particular course of antipsychotic drug treatment, 
[has] shown a need for that treatment sufficiently important to over-
come the individual’s protected interest in refusing it[.]”200  Based on 
this description of the purpose of the four factors, it appears that they 
were designed to help a court determine whether the government 
had satisfied its side of the constitutional balance and had demon-
strated a significant interest in forcible medication.201  As the factors 
were designed to “help” this determination, and not to prove it, the 
Sell Court never indicated that the four factors were all that had to be 
shown to allow forcible medication.202  Because the Court did not 
choose to set out the four Sell factors as a standard to be met and 
overcome, therefore allowing medication once all four factors were 
 
 197. Id. at 179.  The Court made a point to discuss the failure of the state courts in Rig-
gins to consider the individual’s liberty interest before ordering Riggins’s forced medica-
tion, indicating that such an omission in an analysis of forcible medication to regain com-
petence to stand trial was a very serious error.  Id. 
 198. Id. (emphasis added). 
 199. Id. at 180 (emphasis added). 
 200. Id. at 183 (emphasis added). 
 201. Cf. id. at 181 (“We emphasize that the court applying these standards is seeking to 
determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary significantly to further 
a particular governmental interest, namely, the interest in rendering the defendant com-
petent to stand trial.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 202. See id. at 183 (“[T]he factors . . . should help [a court] make the ultimate constitu-
tionally required judgment.”) (emphasis added). 
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shown,203 the possibility remains that the four factors could instead be 
applied as a part of a balancing test. 
3. Courts Could Apply the Sell Factors in a Balancing Format 
Without Changing the Factors or the Rationale Behind the 
Decision 
The structure and content of the four Sell factors, as originally set 
out by the Supreme Court, actually forces courts to consider the gov-
ernmental and individual interests side by side;204 thus, shifting the 
factors into a balancing test would require very little in the way of sub-
stantive change.  The first Sell factor, in fact, explicitly addresses the 
government’s need to have “important” interests at stake in prosecut-
ing the charged individual.205  This important governmental interest 
represents one half of the proposed ad hoc balancing test, and would 
be bolstered by individualized findings in support of the effectiveness 
of the proposed treatment.  The other half of the test would call for a 
detailed analysis of the individual’s interests in not being forcibly 
medicated and would consider, in part, other treatments that might 
be available, the possibility for civil commitment, and the side effects 
that antipsychotic drugs might cause.  These concerns already exist in 
the remaining Sell factors.206  A balancing-style test would subsume the 
second, third, and fourth Sell factors into the overall interests at stake 
on each side, perhaps giving weight to either the individual or the 
government, but not by themselves sufficient to allow forcible medica-
tion. 
For example, courts performing a Sell analysis already require the 
government to identify specific drugs in specific dosages and to plan 
for possible side effects the individual might experience.207  The gov-
ernment must also tailor its arguments in favor of prosecution to the 
 
 203. See id. at 180 (stating that the instances where medication is allowed will be “rare”). 
 204. See id. (noting that the four-factor analysis requires courts to “consider the facts of 
the individual case in evaluating the Government’s interest in prosecution”). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 180–81 (explaining the possible special circumstances that may lessen the 
government’s interest, the necessity of medication, and the medical appropriateness of 
medication). 
 207. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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crimes for which the individual has been charged.208  A balancing test 
would still require courts to consider the same factors, but would con-
sider them standards rather than “necessary or sufficient condi-
tion[s]” for depriving an individual of his liberty interest.209  The bal-
ancing test format would also allow those individualized findings to 
support either side of the scale: If the government, for example, has 
not identified which antipsychotic medications it plans to use to treat 
the defendant, the absence of that finding would bolster the individu-
al’s assertion that the government does not have a strong enough ar-
gument to outweigh his interest in remaining free from forcible med-
ication.  If the treatment plan is highly individualized, however, the 
individual could still introduce evidence of special circumstances that 
argue against his medication.  The last three Sell factors could there-
fore be considered a kind of safeguard: without them the government 
cannot demonstrate an interest strong enough to overcome the indi-
vidual’s liberty right, but the existence of those factors does not guar-
antee that the government’s argument will prevail.210 
The standards of review the lower courts have given this particu-
lar factor also support transforming the first Sell factor into one half of 
a constitutional balancing test.  The first Sell factor is unique in that it 
is reviewed de novo, as a legal finding, in every circuit that has ad-
dressed Sell-type cases.211  The other three factors are considered fac-
tual in nature, except in the Tenth Circuit where only the third and 
fourth factors are reviewed as factual.212  Because the last three factors 
 
 208. Cf. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (discussing how the government has an important interest 
in prosecuting serious crimes, but the facts of the individual case will affect that prosecuto-
rial interest). 
 209. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (stating that the four factors for de-
termining whether the right to a speedy trial was violated were not “necessary or sufficient 
condition[s]”). 
 210. Cf. id. (noting that the four factors outlined in the Court’s decision were merely 
related, not “talismanic,” and “must be considered together with such other circumstances 
as may be relevant”). 
 211. See supra Part II.C.1.  The Tenth Circuit is unique in treating both the first and se-
cond factors de novo.  United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d 1107, 1113–14 & n.12 (10th Cir. 
2005).  The other eight circuits to address Sell have not followed the Tenth Circuit’s lead, 
even when some of them addressed the Sell factors as a matter of first impression and had 
the Tenth Circuit’s approach available for guidance.  See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 630 
F.3d 1314, 1331 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 128 (2011) (citing Bradley but disa-
greeing with it and choosing to follow the other circuits to address the Sell factors). 
 212. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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are reviewed as factual, courts could conceivably resolve them differ-
ently in every forcible medication case, where different facts would 
present each time.  The consistent review of the governmental inter-
est factor as a legal conclusion, however, suggests that this interest is 
either present or absent in every case.  The willingness of the appel-
late courts to consider the first Sell factor legally and the last three fac-
tors factually provides further support for the contention that the for-
cible medication analysis should be applied in an individualized 
balancing test, where the ultimate goal is to prove that the govern-
ment has an interest sufficiently strong to overcome the individual’s 
constitutional liberty interest in avoiding forced medication. 
C.  Circuit Courts of Appeals, Including the Fourth Circuit,Have Taken 
Steps Toward a Balancing Test, Suggesting That a Balancing 
Approach Would Not Be Difficult to Implement 
Although courts that performed Sell analyses did not explicitly 
adopt a balancing test format, they considered the four factors in such 
a way that balancing was either referenced outright213 or was implicitly 
supported by the way the factors were discussed.214  Other courts 
compared their current cases to other forcible medication decisions 
from other circuits and drew distinctions between the cases, another 
indication that balancing-style methods were implicitly adopted.215  
These practices suggest that courts could easily convert the Sell analy-
sis into a balancing test without adversely affecting the way decisions 
are made. 
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that has explicitly refused to 
apply the Sell analysis as a balancing test.  In United States v. Ruiz-
Gaxiola, the Ninth Circuit found that “[t]he Sell factors do not repre-
sent a balancing test, but a set of independent requirements, each of 
which must be found to be true before the forcible administration of 
psychotropic drugs may be considered constitutionally permissible.”216  
The court, however, did not have an independent, precedential basis 
for this statement and instead reached its conclusion that the four fac-
tors act as mere barriers to overcome based on a textual reading of 
 
 213. See infra notes 219–223 and accompanying text. 
 214. See infra notes 227–228 and accompanying text.  
 215. See infra notes 224–228 and accompanying text. 
 216. 623 F.3d 684, 691 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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Sell.217  No other circuit court has reached this conclusion, making the 
Ninth Circuit an outlier court in this respect in the same way the 
Tenth Circuit is an outlier court in its standard of review of the se-
cond Sell factor.218 
On the other end of the spectrum, the Third Circuit arguably at-
tempted to apply the Sell factors in a balancing test format in United 
States v. Grape.219  Grape involved a challenge to the government’s satis-
faction of the first and second Sell factors: whether the government 
had demonstrated a sufficiently important interest to justify medica-
tion and whether that medication was substantially likely to restore 
Grape to competence.220  Although the Third Circuit recognized that 
 
 217. See United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 2008) (phras-
ing the Sell factors as findings the trial court must make before allowing medication); see 
also Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at, 691 (citing the Hernandez-Vasquez Court’s listing of the Sell 
factors for the proposition that the factors should not be applied as a balancing test but 
should instead be seen as “a set of independent requirements”). 
 218. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 219. 549 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 2008).  John Douglas Grape, diagnosed with paranoid schiz-
ophrenia, was charged with the receipt and possession of child pornography.  Id. at 592–
93.  The Third Circuit affirmed the order from the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania granting the government’s motion to allow forcible medi-
cation.  Id.  The Third Circuit also reviewed one other district court decision relating to 
the Sell factors, United States v. Muhammad, 398 F. App’x 848 (3d Cir. 2010).  Muhammad, 
however, yielded no additional discussion as to how the Third Circuit would apply the Sell 
factors, and the court simply stated that its analysis was limited “to the narrow question of 
whether the [district court] properly applied the four Sell factors.  We have reviewed the 
record and we are satisfied that the Court's opinion responded to the contentions Mu-
hammad has made before us.  We will affirm its judgment without further discussion.”  Id. 
at 849–50. 
 220. Grape, 549 F.3d at 592.  The Third Circuit dismissed Grape’s arguments as to the 
second Sell factor on factual grounds.  Id. at 604.  Grape had actually been forcibly medi-
cated by the time of his appeal for the safety reasons set out in Harper.  Id. at 592–93.  Be-
cause that forcible medication restored Grape to competency in the past, the Third Circuit 
disposed of the issue of whether forcible medication was substantially likely to restore 
Grape to competence.  Id. at 604.  The court, however, did take note of “the research and 
scientific and empirical evidence the parties debated regarding the likelihood that anti-
psychotic medications would restore Grape to competency.”  Id. at 605 (citation omitted).  
That evidence included the identification of a specific drug, an outline of a dosage regi-
men, and contingencies for dealing with identified potential side effects—all of which 
would have appeared to satisfy the criteria set out in Evans, although the Third Circuit did 
not expressly mention Evans in its analysis.  Id. at 595–96.  
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Grape made a convincing argument about the possibility of his civil 
commitment that might work against the government’s interest in 
bringing him to trial, it stated that “we must balance Grape’s strong ar-
gument against the Government’s interests.”221  As a result of this bal-
ancing, the court found that “Grape’s arguments do not outweigh the 
Government’s.  Therefore, the Government’s interest is sufficiently 
strong to outweigh Grape’s liberty interest and to meet [the first fac-
tor] of the Sell test.”222  The use of balancing test language and the 
court’s explicit recognition of the defendant’s individualized argu-
ments—in particular, the possibility that Grape could be committed 
as opposed to tried in court—indicate that the restructuring of the 
Sell test as a balancing analysis would not be fundamentally different 
from some of the analyses in which lower courts have already en-
gaged.223  
The Eighth Circuit undertook a balancing-style analysis in the Sell 
arena as well, although it did not use balancing language explicitly.  
One of the benefits of a balancing test is that it allows courts to com-
pare the “relevant similarities and differences” between cases that are 
substantively alike.224  In United States v. Nicklas,225 the Eighth Circuit 
spent a portion of its forcible medication analysis drawing compari-
sons and distinctions between Nicklas’s case and the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in White.226  The fact that both cases raised the same substan-
 
 221. Id. at 600, 602 (emphasis added). 
 222. Id. at 603 (emphasis added).  The Third Circuit found that governmental interests 
outweighed Grape’s individual liberty interest based specifically on Grape’s status as a re-
peat offender, the opportunity for supervised release that would come with a potential 
conviction, and the fact that Grape would still be required to serve the majority of any sen-
tence imposed on him.  Id. at 602. 
 223. Perhaps taking notice of the fact that Sell was not explicitly set out as a balancing 
test, the Third Circuit also noted that the four factors as a whole made up “a standard that 
the government must meet in order to overcome the inmate’s liberty interest.”  Id. at 599.  
The crux of the Third Circuit’s opinion, however, was that the government’s interest—the 
first Sell factor—could overcome Grape’s arguments against medication, suggesting that 
the court tacitly adopted a balancing format.  Id. at 603. 
 224. Sullivan, Rules and Standards, supra note 162, at 66. 
 225. 623 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 124 (2011). 
 226. Id. at 1179–80.  In affirming the government’s motion to forcibly medicate Nicklas, 
the Eighth Circuit compared the time Nicklas spent in pretrial custody to the time White 
served, Nicklas’ propensity to be a repeat offender to the lack of evidence that White 
would commit similar crimes, and the violent nature of Nicklas’s crime to the nonviolent 
nature of White’s.  Id.  
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tive issue of whether the defendant could be forcibly medicated to 
render him competent, and that the court relied on factual distinc-
tions between its own case and earlier cases to help make its decision, 
provides support for the argument that a balancing test that takes 
note of individualized distinctions could be applied effectively in a Sell 
analysis. 
The Fourth Circuit itself discussed the application of the Sell fac-
tors in a way that would lend itself to a balancing test.  Evans and Bush 
discussed the second and fourth Sell factors as one single unit, not as 
two separate elements that exist independently of one another.227  
The Evans court, in particular, made no effort to separate the second 
“significantly further” factor from the fourth “medically appropriate” 
factor and required the government to provide individualized find-
ings before satisfying either.228  If the court had considered each fac-
tor as an element to be proven individually before medication would 
be allowed, it would not have combined two of those four factors into 
one determination.  Because the Fourth Circuit already adopted a 
forcible medication analysis that addresses two of the three factual 
factors as one unit, it would be a simple and logical step to consider 
the last three factors together, as part of the overall determination of 
whether the government has expressed an interest important enough 
to overcome the individual’s constitutional rights. 
D.  Instead of Adopting a Conjectural Approach That Rendered the Sell 
Factors Increasingly Unwieldy, the Fourth Circuit in White Should 
Have Taken the Opportunity to Apply the Sell Factors in a 
Constitutionally Appropriate Balancing Test 
In White, the Fourth Circuit went beyond further defining the 
four Sell factors and entered the realm of conjecture when it conduct-
ed its own sentencing analysis for White before she ever stood trial.229  
This sentencing calculation confused the court’s analysis and led it to 
focus on issues that were not relevant to the individualized focus ad-
 
 227. See United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 815–17 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing the se-
cond and fourth Sell factors under their own headings, but citing to the Evans requirement 
that the second and fourth factors be shown by an individualized plan); United States v. 
Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 240–42 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing the second and fourth Sell factors 
under the same heading and repeatedly referring to both factors together).  
 228. Evans, 404 F.3d at 240–41.  
 229. See supra Part III; see also United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 424 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s sentencing calculation was based on 
“rank speculation”). 
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vocated in its earlier decisions.230  Instead of creating this complicated 
calculation, the Fourth Circuit should have used White as an oppor-
tunity to develop, and explicitly adopt, a balancing test that would 
have properly weighed White’s constitutional liberty interests against 
the government’s interest in prosecution.231 
1.  The Majority’s Decision in White Renders the Application of the 
Sell Factors Increasingly Unwieldy and Overly Conjectural 
As a result of the majority’s decision in White, courts in the 
Fourth Circuit may face the daunting and unwieldy task of calculating 
a defendant’s potential sentence when deciding whether to grant the 
government’s motion for forcible medication of mentally incompe-
tent defendants.  The Supreme Court did not contemplate this kind 
of analysis in Sell, and, until White, it had not been undertaken by the 
Fourth Circuit or the other circuit courts.  Admittedly, the Sell analysis 
is fact-intensive by design, and therefore the results cannot be entirely 
predictable.232  The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the first Sell factor, and 
its attendant special circumstances, however, went beyond an individ-
ualized analysis.  By attempting to calculate both White’s time served 
and her potential sentence if convicted,233 the court turned an analy-
sis that in the past had focused on a defendant’s possible individual 
reactions to antipsychotic medications into highly conjectural guess-
work not conceived by the Supreme Court.234 
The court’s decision to “calculate White’s time served, her likely 
sentence, and then ask whether the former is significant in light of 
the latter”235 is directly contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s prior decisions 
in Evans and Bush, where sentencing guidelines were not analyzed 
 
 230. See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 231. See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 232. Cf. Evans, 404 F.3d at 241 (criticizing the lower court for accepting a report that 
did not analyze Evans as an individual and did not take note of his particular physiology 
before approving the government’s forcible medication plan, and noting that to accept 
generic plans “would be to find the government necessarily meets its burden in every case 
[in which] it wishes to use . . . antipsychotic medication”). 
 233. White, 620 F.3d at 414–17 (majority opinion). 
 234. See id. at 424, 429 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s focus on 
sentencing “create[d] new standards and a new process without legal support and relie[d] 
on gross speculation” and that a faithful application of the Sell factors would have support-
ed forcible medication). 
 235. Id. at 414 (majority opinion). 
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and the maximum statutory penalty was sufficient to establish that a 
serious crime was committed.236  Indeed, the Evans court specifically 
considered such a focus on potential sentence calculation as both 
“unworkable” and “uniquely inappropriate” in the context of a Sell 
analysis.237  The Bush court was equally clear about the potential effect 
of time served as a special circumstance, stating that time served in an 
amount long enough to cover a potential sentence did not, by itself, 
defeat the government’s interest.238  In addition to circumventing ear-
lier Fourth Circuit decisions, this focus on calculating White’s poten-
tial sentence created a new step in the Sell analysis that no other cir-
cuit had adopted: The Fourth Circuit appears to be the only circuit 
court that has attempted such a sentencing calculation in determin-
ing whether the government established an important interest in 
prosecuting.239 
The majority in White also moved the Sell analysis further away 
from the fact-specific and individually focused analysis recommended 
by Sell240 and by other courts241 by considering both the sentence of 
White’s co-defendant and the median and mean sentences imposed 
 
 236. See United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 814–15 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting Bush’s pos-
sible sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines but not relying on that figure for any sort 
of analysis); Evans, 404 F.3d at 237 (disagreeing with Evans’s claim that the Sentencing 
Guidelines were the appropriate focus in determining the seriousness of the charges 
against him). 
 237. Evans, 404 F.3d at 237–38.  The Evans court considered a sentencing guideline 
range unworkable because it would require an appellate court to calculate a probable sen-
tencing range in the absence of the factual findings contained in a presentence report 
(“PSR”), which was typically prepared: 
pursuant to testimony presented at trial or the plea and a detailed investigation 
of the defendant.  A focus on the probable guideline range as the barometer of 
seriousness would shift this fact-finding to a time before the defendant’s trial or 
plea, before the Probation Office prepares its report, and at a time when the dis-
trict court has already ruled that the defendant himself is incompetent. 
Id. at 238. 
 238. Bush, 585 F.3d at 815.  Bush argued that the Sentencing Guidelines called for a 
sentence ranging from twenty-four to thirty months, and that she had been in confine-
ment for eighteen months at the time of her appeal.  Id. at 814. 
 239. See White, 620 F.3d at 428 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the attempt to cal-
culate White’s possible sentence was “unprecedented and unsupportable”). 
 240. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). 
 241. See, e.g., Evans, 404 F.3d at 240–41 (stating multiple times that the government 
should have analyzed Evans “as an individual”). 
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nationally for similar crimes.242  The majority even admitted that this 
sentencing analogy between White and her codefendant, Baker, was 
“imperfect; Baker pled guilty to only three counts (White [wa]s 
charged in six) and, unlike White, Baker provided substantial assis-
tance to law enforcement.”243  Indeed, this approach of looking to 
median sentences and sentences imposed on other defendants re-
moved the element of individuality from the Sell analysis calculus be-
cause these sentencing considerations were an attempt to force White 
into compliance with preexisting sentences as opposed to focusing on 
her individual characteristics and considerations.244  Most distressing 
of all, perhaps, is the fact that the White majority’s attempt to calculate 
White’s possible sentence before a trial had even taken place led the 
Fourth Circuit into an area of law where it was “totally without legal 
support,” given that courts of appeals “cannot conduct sen-
tencings.”245  Introducing this sentencing analysis into the examina-
tion of the governmental interest factor convoluted the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s existing Sell analysis, which had been fairly well defined.246 
2.  The Fourth Circuit in White Missed an Opportunity to Apply the 
Sell Factors as a Constitutionally Appropriate Balancing-Test 
By the time White was decided, the Fourth Circuit had defined 
nearly all the other elements of the Sell factors that had proved con-
fusing: what constituted a serious crime,247 whether medication was 
medically appropriate,248 how to measure whether medication would 
 
 242. White, 620 F.3d at 415–16 (majority opinion). 
 243. Id. at 416 n.16. 
 244. See id. at 415 (noting that the majority was attempting to calculate a sentence for 
White that would fit into a scheme of “uniformity [of] sentencing” among “similarly situat-
ed defendants”).  As the dissent in White and the majority in Evans note, however, sentenc-
ing is inherently an individualized calculation, and any attempt to base a hypothetical sen-
tence solely off the Sentencing Guidelines or on sentences of “dissimilar” co-offenders 
destroys that individuality.  See White, 620 F.3d at 428 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the individual analysis of White that would be required in sentencing); see also Evans, 404 
F.3d at 238 (noting that sentencing requires a Presentence Report that includes a detailed 
investigation of the individual defendant). 
 245. White, 620 F.3d at 429. 
 246. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 247. Evans, 404 F.3d at 238. 
 248. Id. at 240. 
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significantly further the government’s interest in prosecution249 and 
what standard of proof and standard of review an appellate court 
should apply.250  In short, the court—and the government—were 
aware of what needed to be shown to overcome the individual’s inter-
est in not being forcibly medicated.  In using the opportunity to apply 
the Sell factors in a balancing format, the Fourth Circuit could have 
given the appropriate respect to the individual’s strong interest in not 
being forcibly medicated and continued to set itself apart as a leader 
in forcible medication cases.  Instead, the court shied away from this 
individualized analysis and turned the Sell inquiry into a conjectural, 
unwieldy, and speculative exercise.  Not only would a balancing test 
have been the more appropriate choice, it would have been a more 
consistent choice given the Fourth Circuit’s earlier decisions.251  In 
fact, the Fourth Circuit had already laid the foundations for applying 
Sell as a balancing test.  Evans and Bush considered the second and 
fourth factors as a unit, indicating that the appropriateness of the 
medication regime could not logically be separated from the re-
quirement that the medication significantly further the government’s 
interest in prosecution.252 
Not only had the Fourth Circuit set itself up for applying a bal-
ancing test based on its earlier decisions, it also suggested in parts of 
its White opinion that a balancing test could have reached the same 
conclusion without having to enter the conjectural realm through its 
sentencing analysis.  Indeed, the Fourth Circuit outlined a list of con-
siderations, some of which were individualized to this specific case, 
supported White’s side of the balance, and undermined the govern-
ment’s arguments in favor of medication.253  These factors included 
“the amount of time that [White] ha[d] spent . . . in confinement be-
fore her trial,” “the nature of the crime” White was charged with, the 
list of activities White would be precluded from as a result of her ad-
mission to a mental hospital, White’s “unique medical condition,” and 
whether this specific case was “exceptional.”254  After setting out this 
list of factors supporting the individual’s side of the balance, however, 
 
 249. Id. at 240–41. 
 250. Id. at 236, 240; United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 814 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 251. See supra Part IV.C. 
 252. See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text. 
 253. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 413 (4th Cir. 2010) (majority opinion). 
 254. Id. 
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the Fourth Circuit entered into its ill-advised sentencing proceeding 
and detracted all attention from any sort of balancing it employed.255 
The court’s venture into sentencing could have been avoided 
had the court focused on how the four Sell factors weighed against the 
government.  The majority remarked that “White’s unique medical 
condition lessen[ed] the government’s interest in prosecution be-
cause the proposed medical treatment has rarely, if ever, been tested 
on individuals with White’s condition and thus may not rehabilitate 
White . . . .”256  This concern is reminiscent of the second and fourth 
Sell factors, which Evans and Bush discussed as a unit, and is individu-
ally tailored in such a way that it would have bolstered White’s inter-
ests in not being medicated.  Additionally, the Fourth Circuit spent 
time addressing how White’s case was not “sufficiently exceptional to 
warrant forcible medication,”257 a consideration independent from 
the four factors identified in Sell that nonetheless would have coun-
tered any government argument in favor of medication.  Although 
the Fourth Circuit had all the tools necessary to apply Sell as a balanc-
ing test, and although it introduced in White a new set of factors that 
could be considered on the individual’s side of the balance, it failed 
to actually adopting a balancing test.  Instead, it complicated the Sell 
analysis when it chose the sentencing path.  As a result, this decision 
promises to complicate future forcible medication decisions, while 
moving further away from the constitutional balancing that this indi-
vidual liberty interest requires. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In United States v. White, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit missed an opportunity to apply the four Sell factors 
in a constitutionally appropriate, balancing-style test.258  Instead, the 
court made the forcible medication inquiry overly conjectural and 
complicated by performing a sentencing analysis before the defend-
ant stood trial.259  The court’s decision in White moved the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s forcible medication jurisprudence further away from the under-
standings of the individual’s liberty interest in avoiding unwanted 
 
 255. See id. at 414–17 (analyzing White’s likely sentence). 
 256. Id. at 420; see also supra note 137 (discussing the difficulties in predicting the effect 
of antipsychotic medication on White based on existing studies). 
 257. White, 620 F.3d at 421. 
 258. See supra Parts IV.B.3, D.2. 
 259. See supra Part IV.D.1. 
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medical treatment articulated in Washington v. Harper, Riggins v. Neva-
da, and Sell v. United States,260 and ignored the individualized focus it 
called for in its own decisions in United States v. Evans and United States 
v. Bush.261  The Fourth Circuit would have been more faithful to the 
individual and governmental interests at stake in forcible medication 
cases if it had taken the opportunity to balance them against each 
other.262  Had the Fourth Circuit used a balancing test, its decision 
would have comported with other circuit court decisions, including its 
own,263 and would have endorsed a style of analysis appropriate for 
such an individually focused area of the law.264  The court’s failure to 
do so downplays the interests on both sides, but especially discounts 
the individual’s constitutional liberty interest in being free from for-
cible medication.265  
 
 260. See supra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 261. See supra Parts II.C.2, IV.C. 
 262. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 263. See supra Part IV.C. 
 264. See supra Part IV.A. 
 265. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
